In my paper titled “Traces of Zoroastrianism in Muslim Theological Thought on Qadar: Olama- ye Eslām Texts,” I examine the polemical exchanges between the Mu’tazila and Ahl al- Sunna theologians on the doctrine of destiny (qadar). The central argument of my study is that, although both sides accused each other of “Majūsī” (Zoroastrian) tendencies, it was in fact the Ahl al-Sunna theologians whose fatalistic reasoning stood much closer to Zoroastrian conceptions of fate and divine determination.
The study first establishes that from the early spread of Islam into Iranian territories, a strong polemical dialogue developed between Muslim theologians and Zoroastrian religious authorities concerning creation, eschatology, and destiny. This intellectual confrontation produced a body of polemical literature, among which the Škand Gumanīg Wizārand the Olama-ye Eslām texts occupy a central place.
Within Islamic Kalām, a similar polemic emerged between the Mu’tazila and the Ahl al- Sunna regarding human acts and divine will. While Ahl al-Sunna theologians such as al- Māturīdī accused the Mu’tazila of being “Majūs,” the Mu’tazilites, including Qādī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, interpreted the well-known hadith—”The Qadariyya are the Majūs of this ummah”—as a condemnation of the fatalists (Jabriyya). According to the Mu’tazila, the belief that God creates both good and evil closely resembles the dualism of Zoroastrianism.
My analysis focuses particularly on the Olama-ye Eslām epistles, written in Persian as replies to Muslim scholars’ questions. Two versions are examined, one of which, as Blochet suggested, may have been transcribed from a Pahlavi original. These texts directly address major Kalām questions about theodicy: how misfortunes, poverty, or mass killings can be reconciled with the mercy and justice of God. They emphasize the logical contradiction within a theology that attributes every act—good or evil— to divine decree while still holding humans morally responsible.
The Olama-ye Eslām texts employ a dialectical style similar to that of Kalām. One of their key questions is: “Can the creator of good destroy the creator of evil?” The response asserts that if good and evil both proceed from one essence, then two opposite actions would arise from a single source, which is impossible. In addition, these texts elevate Time(Zamān or Zervān) to a metaphysical principle, and in one version, Time is described as the very origin from which Ahura Mazda himself emerged.
To support these findings, the paper also examines the idea of destiny in classical Zoroastrian sources such as the Bundahišn, Dēnkard, and Mēnōg ī Xrad. These works reveal a clear belief in a universal destiny— a predetermined order governing the creation, the unfolding of cosmic history, and the final renovation of the world (Frashkart). This destiny operates within a 12,000-year cosmic framework ruled by zodiacal epochs. In contrast, individual destiny is treated differently across texts: some affirm that a person’s wealth, spouse, and lifespan are fixed by fate (baxt), while others, such as the Dēnkard, allow for human choice and moral responsibility in resisting evil.
In conclusion, my study demonstrates that while the Olama-ye Eslām texts affirm a notion of universal destiny similar to that of Zoroastrian cosmology, they also echo Ahl al-Sunna‘s position on individual destiny. Thus, both systems share the tension between divine omnipotence and human agency. The accusation of “Majūsī” directed at the Mu’tazila, who defended divine justice and unity, is therefore inconsistent and unfounded. The analysis shows that the same logical contradiction observable in Zoroastrian fatalism also appears within the Ahl al- Sunna theological framework.
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